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  1. #21


    Quote Originally Posted by oca
    Remember the military operations on local bandit Abu Sabaya and terrorist group Abu Sayyaf?

    Did the Americans actually learned something from the operations to trace Abu Sabaya and applied in it their pursuit of Osama Bin Laden?

    In one of the pursuit operations against Abu Sayyaf in the middle in the jungle, they found packaging of newly purchased underwear and deodorants and other vanity items for male. They figured out that someone must be delivering these items Abu Sabaya, as it is obvious those items can't be purchased in the jungle. So, instead of intensifying efforts in the jungle pursuit, AFP intelligence monitored suspected accomplices and sympathizers from the urban areas.

    They zeroed in on individuals who had no business to go to remote and forested areas where Abu Sayyaf was said to be hiding but actually were traveling to this remote places. When they were able to identify a strong lead, they had a government operative plant a tracking device on the back pack that was used by the identified accomplice/ sympathizer.

    They successfully traced Abu Sabaya and killed him in an encounter. A press release was issued to announce the death of Abu Sabaya, but there were reservations from some sectors as there was no body to prove that he was actually killed.

    Here is now an operation on Osama Bin Laden that started when the intelligence operatives were able to trace the favorite courier of the founder of Al Qaida. Trailed him and found him to be visiting an address in a location that is considered a military community. What business does a suspected Osama courier doing in a known military community? Then, when they conducted the operation, they actually made an effort to possess the body of the dead Osama to have proof that he is actually dead.

    -- accomplices/ sympathizers going to places they had no business to be at,
    -- taking possession of the body of the target.


    All the while I had thought that the joint Philippine-US military operations was a lopsided arrangement for the AFP side. I wondered what the AFP and the operations here could offer the US. What benefit is there to gain for the Americans?

    Well, based on the narratives on this operations, they benefited and did learned something.
    oca, there was a documentary about the operation against Abu Sabaya. The man who was helping Sabaya was a former GS/HS classmate of his. That classmate of his turned against him and informed the AFP. And with the help of the CIA, they tracked down the Abu Sayaf leader.

    They even showed actual videos on that documentary the night they ambushed Sabaya. The CIA used a drone hovering above the waters. The CIA and AFP were able to track Sabay because of the bugged satellite phone. Sabaya asked his classmate to purchase that phone, little did he know that it was already bugged.

    As part of the deal, the AFP took credit. But without the CIA, they would not been able to accomplish the operation.

  2. #22


    Pakistani authorities still have a lot of explaining to do, considering where Osama Bin Laden was when he finally met his end. Truly these Pakistanis are even worse than Filipinos, with the world's most wanted and most dangerous man right in their own front lawn. There is no way anybody will ever convince me that no one in the Pakistani government or defense/security establishment did not know about Bin Laden being just several miles removed from Islamabad. President Barrack Obama simply gave a de rigeur acknowledgement by saying Pakistani intelligence authorities provided assistance in this operation. I hope those who were colluding with Bin Laden, even if the same never makes the headlines, are now one with the devil they harbored.

  3. #23


    From the New York Times ---

    Clues Gradually led to Location of Quaeda Chief

    WASHINGTON — For years, the agonizing search for Osama bin Laden kept coming up empty. Then last July, Pakistanis working for the Central Intelligence Agency drove up behind a white Suzuki navigating the bustling streets near Peshawar, Pakistan, and wrote down the car’s license plate.

    The man in the car was Bin Laden’s most trusted courier, and over the next month C.I.A. operatives would track him throughout central Pakistan. Ultimately, administration officials said, he led them to a sprawling compound at the end of a long dirt road and surrounded by tall security fences in a wealthy hamlet 35 miles from the Pakistani capital.

    On a moonless night eight months later, 79 American commandos in four helicopters descended on the compound, the officials said. Shots rang out. A helicopter stalled and would not take off. Pakistani authorities, kept in the dark by their allies in Washington, scrambled forces as the American commandos rushed to finish their mission and leave before a confrontation. Of the five dead, one was a tall, bearded man with a bloodied face and a bullet in his head. A member of the Navy Seals snapped his picture with a camera and uploaded it to analysts who fed it into a facial recognition program.

    And just like that, history’s most expansive, expensive and exasperating manhunt was over. The inert frame of Osama bin Laden, America’s enemy No. 1, was placed in a helicopter for burial at sea, never to be seen or feared again. A nation that spent a decade tormented by its failure to catch the man responsible for nearly 3,000 fiery deaths in New York, Washington and Pennsylvania on Sept. 11, 2001, at long last had its sense of finality, at least in this one difficult chapter.

    For an intelligence community that had endured searing criticism for a string of intelligence failures over the past decade, Bin Laden’s killing brought a measure of redemption. For a military that has slogged through two, and now three vexing wars in Muslim countries, it provided an unalloyed success. And for a president whose national security leadership has come under question, it proved an affirming moment that will enter the history books.

    The raid was the culmination of years of painstaking intelligence work, including the interrogation of C.I.A. detainees in secret prisons in Eastern Europe, where sometimes what was not said was as useful as what was. Intelligence agencies eavesdropped on telephone calls and e-mails of the courier’s Arab family in a Persian Gulf state and pored over satellite images of the compound in Abbottabad to determine a “pattern of life” that might decide whether the operation would be worth the risk.

    As more than a dozen White House, intelligence and Pentagon officials described the operation on Monday, the past few weeks were a nerve-racking amalgamation of what-ifs and negative scenarios. “There wasn’t a meeting when someone didn’t mention ‘Black Hawk Down,’ ” a senior administration official said, referring to the disastrous 1993 battle in Somalia in which two American helicopters were shot down and some of their crew killed in action. The failed mission to rescue hostages in Iran in 1980 also loomed large.

    Administration officials split over whether to launch the operation, whether to wait and continue monitoring until they were more sure that Bin Laden was really there, or whether to go for a less risky bombing assault. In the end, President Obama opted against a bombing that could do so much damage it might be uncertain whether Bin Laden was really hit and chose to send in commandos. A “fight your way out” option was built into the plan, with two helicopters following the two main assault copters as backup in case of trouble.

    On Sunday afternoon, as the helicopters raced over Pakistani territory, the president and his advisers gathered in the Situation Room of the White House to monitor the operation as it unfolded. Much of the time was spent in silence. Mr. Obama looked “stone faced,” one aide said. Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr. fingered his rosary beads. “The minutes passed like days,” recalled John O. Brennan, the White House counterterrorism chief.

    The code name for Bin Laden was “Geronimo.” The president and his advisers watched Leon E. Panetta, the C.I.A. director, on a video screen, narrating from his agency’s headquarters across the Potomac River what was happening in faraway Pakistan.

    “They’ve reached the target,” he said.

    Minutes passed.

    “We have a visual on Geronimo,” he said.

    A few minutes later: “Geronimo EKIA.”

    Enemy Killed In Action. There was silence in the Situation Room.

    Finally, the president spoke up.

    “We got him.”

    Filling in the Gaps

    Years before the Sept. 11 attacks transformed Bin Laden into the world’s most feared terrorist, the C.I.A. had begun compiling a detailed dossier about the major players inside his global terror network.

    It wasn’t until after 2002, when the agency began rounding up Qaeda operatives — and subjecting them to hours of brutal interrogation sessions in secret overseas prisons — that they finally began filling in the gaps about the foot soldiers, couriers and money men Bin Laden relied on.

    Prisoners in American custody told stories of a trusted courier. When the Americans ran the man’s pseudonym past two top-level detainees — the chief planner of the Sept. 11 attacks, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed; and Al Qaeda’s operational chief, Abu Faraj al-Libi — the men claimed never to have heard his name. That raised suspicions among interrogators that the two detainees were lying and that the courier probably was an important figure.

    As the hunt for Bin Laden continued, the spy agency was being buffeted on other fronts: the botched intelligence assessments about weapons of mass destruction leading up to the Iraq War, and the intense criticism for using waterboarding and other extreme interrogation methods that critics said amounted to torture.


  4. #24


    (Cont'd from above)

    By 2005, many inside the C.I.A. had reached the conclusion that the Bin Laden hunt had grown cold, and the agency’s top clandestine officer ordered an overhaul of the agency’s counterterrorism operations. The result was Operation Cannonball, a bureaucratic reshuffling that placed more C.I.A. case officers on the ground in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

    With more agents in the field, the C.I.A. finally got the courier’s family name. With that, they turned to one of their greatest investigative tools — the National Security Agency began intercepting telephone calls and e-mail messages between the man’s family and anyone inside Pakistan. From there they got his full name.

    Last July, Pakistani agents working for the C.I.A. spotted him driving his vehicle near Peshawar. When, after weeks of surveillance, he drove to the sprawling compound in Abbottabad, American intelligence operatives felt they were onto something big, perhaps even Bin Laden himself. It was hardly the spartan cave in the mountains that many had envisioned as his hiding place. Rather, it was a three-story house ringed by 12-foot-high concrete walls, topped with barbed wire and protected by two security fences. He was, said Mr. Brennan, the White House official, “hiding in plain sight.”

    Back in Washington, Mr. Panetta met with Mr. Obama and his most senior national security aides, including Mr. Biden, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates. The meeting was considered so secret that White House officials didn’t even list the topic in their alerts to each other.

    That day, Mr. Panetta spoke at length about Bin Laden and his presumed hiding place.

    “It was electric,” an administration official who attended the meeting said. “For so long, we’d been trying to get a handle on this guy. And all of a sudden, it was like, wow, there he is.”

    There was guesswork about whether Bin Laden was indeed inside the house. What followed was weeks of tense meetings between Mr. Panetta and his subordinates about what to do next.

    While Mr. Panetta advocated an aggressive strategy to confirm Bin Laden’s presence, some C.I.A. clandestine officers worried that the most promising lead in years might be blown if bodyguards suspected the compound was being watched and spirited the Qaeda leader out of the area.

    For weeks last fall, spy satellites took detailed photographs, and the N.S.A. worked to scoop up any communications coming from the house. It wasn’t easy: the compound had neither a phone line nor Internet access. Those inside were so concerned about security that they burned their trash rather than put it on the street for collection.

    In February, Mr. Panetta called Vice Adm. William H. McRaven, commander of the Pentagon’s Joint Special Operations Command, to C.I.A. headquarters in Langley, Va., to give him details about the compound and to begin planning a military strike.

    Admiral McRaven, a veteran of the covert world who had written a book on American Special Operations, spent weeks working with the C.I.A. on the operation, and came up with three options: a helicopter assault using American commandos, a strike with B-2 bombers that would obliterate the compound, or a joint raid with Pakistani intelligence operatives who would be told about the mission hours before the launch.

    Weighing the Options

    On March 14, Mr. Panetta took the options to the White House. C.I.A. officials had been taking satellite photos, establishing what Mr. Panetta described as the habits of people living at the compound. By now evidence was mounting that Bin Laden was there.

    The discussions about what to do took place as American relations with Pakistan were severely strained over the arrest of Raymond A. Davis, the C.I.A. contractor imprisoned for shooting two Pakistanis on a crowded street in Lahore in January. Some of Mr. Obama’s top aides worried that any military assault to capture or kill Bin Laden might provoke an angry response from Pakistan’s government, and that Mr. Davis could end up dead in his jail cell. Mr. Davis was ultimately released on March 16, giving a freer hand to his colleagues.

    On March 22, the president asked his advisers their opinions on the options.

    Mr. Gates was skeptical about a helicopter assault, calling it risky, and instructed military officials to look into aerial bombardment using smart bombs. But a few days later, the officials returned with the news that it would take some 32 bombs of 2,000 pounds each. And how could the American officials be certain that they had killed Bin Laden?

    “It would have created a giant crater, and it wouldn’t have given us a body,” said one American intelligence official.


  5. #25


    (Cont'd from above)

    A helicopter assault emerged as the favored option. The Navy Seals team that would hit the ground began holding dry runs at training facilities on both American coasts, which were made up to resemble the compound. But they were not told who their target might be until later.

    Last Thursday, the day after the president released his long-form birth certificate — such “silliness,” he told reporters, was distracting the country from more important things — Mr. Obama met again with his top national security officials.

    Mr. Panetta told the group that the C.I.A. had “red-teamed” the case — shared their intelligence with other analysts who weren’t involved to see if they agreed that Bin Laden was probably in Abbottabad. They did. It was time to decide.

    Around the table, the group went over and over the negative scenarios. There were long periods of silence, one aide said. And then, finally, Mr. Obama spoke: “I’m not going to tell you what my decision is now — I’m going to go back and think about it some more.” But he added, “I’m going to make a decision soon.”

    Sixteen hours later, he had made up his mind. Early the next morning, four top aides were summoned to the White House Diplomatic Room. Before they could brief the president, he cut them off. “It’s a go,” he said. The earliest the operation could take place was Saturday, but officials cautioned that cloud cover in the area meant that Sunday was much more likely.

    The next day, Mr. Obama took a break from rehearsing for the White House Correspondents Dinner that night to call Admiral McRaven, to wish him luck.

    On Sunday, White House officials canceled all West Wing tours so unsuspecting tourists and visiting celebrities wouldn’t accidentally run into all the high-level national security officials holed up in the Situation Room all afternoon monitoring the feeds they were getting from Mr. Panetta. A staffer went to Costco and came back with a mix of provisions — turkey pita wraps, cold shrimp, potato chips, soda.

    At 2:05 p.m., Mr. Panetta sketched out the operation to the group for a final time. Within an hour, the C.I.A. director began his narration, via video from Langley. “They’ve crossed into Pakistan,” he said.

    Across the Border

    The commando team had raced into the Pakistani night from a base in Jalalabad, just across the border in Afghanistan. The goal was to get in and get out before Pakistani authorities detected the breach of their territory by what were to them unknown forces and reacted with possibly violent results.

    In Pakistan, it was just past midnight on Monday morning, and the Americans were counting on the element of surprise. As the first of the helicopters swooped in at low altitudes, neighbors heard a loud blast and gunshots. A woman who lives two miles away said she thought it was a terrorist attack on a Pakistani military installation. Her husband said no one had any clue Bin Laden was hiding in the quiet, affluent area. “It’s the closest you can be to Britain,” he said of their neighborhood.

    The Seal team stormed into the compound — the raid awakened the group inside, one American intelligence official said — and a firefight broke out. One man held an unidentified woman living there as a shield while firing at the Americans. Both were killed. Two more men died as well, and two women were wounded. American authorities later determined that one of the slain men was Bin Laden’s son, Hamza, and the other two were the courier and his brother.

    The commandos found Bin Laden on the third floor, wearing the local loose-fitting tunic and pants known as a shalwar kameez, and officials said he resisted before he was shot above the left eye near the end of the 40-minute raid. The American government gave few details about his final moments. “Whether or not he got off any rounds, I frankly don’t know,” said Mr. Brennan, the White House counterterrorism chief. But a senior Pentagon official, briefing on the condition of anonymity, said it was clear Bin Laden “was killed by U.S. bullets.”

  6. #26


    (Cont'd from above)

    American officials insisted they would have taken Bin Laden into custody if he did not resist, although they considered that likelihood remote. “If we had the opportunity to take Bin Laden alive, if he didn’t present any threat, the individuals involved were able and prepared to do that,” Mr. Brennan said.

    One of Bin Laden’s wives identified his body, American officials said. A picture taken by a Seals commando and processed through facial recognition software suggested a 95 percent certainty that it was Bin Laden. Later, DNA tests comparing samples with relatives found a 99.9 percent match.

    But the Americans faced other problems. One of their helicopters stalled and could not take off. Rather than let it fall into the wrong hands, the commandos moved the women and children to a secure area and blew up the malfunctioning helicopter.

    By that point, though, the Pakistani military was scrambling forces in response to the incursion into Pakistani territory. “They had no idea about who might have been on there,” Mr. Brennan said. “Thankfully, there was no engagement with Pakistani forces.”

    As they took off at 1:10 a.m. local time, taking a trove of documents and computer hard drives from the house, the Americans left behind the women and children. A Pakistani official said nine children, from 2 to 12 years old, are now in Pakistani custody.

    The Obama administration had already determined it would follow Islamic tradition of burial within 24 hours to avoid offending devout Muslims, yet concluded Bin Laden would have to be buried at sea, since no country would be willing to take the body. Moreover, they did not want to create a shrine for his followers.

    So the Qaeda leader’s body was washed and placed in a white sheet in keeping with tradition. On the aircraft carrier Carl Vinson, it was placed in a weighted bag as an officer read prepared religious remarks, which were translated into Arabic by a native speaker, according to the senior Pentagon official.

    The body then was placed on a prepared flat board and eased into the sea. Only a small group of people watching from one of the large elevator platforms that move aircraft up to the flight deck were witness to the end of America’s most wanted fugitive.

  7. #27


    What Drives History


    Osama Bin Laden’s mother was about 15 at the time of his birth. Nicknamed “The Slave” inside the family, she was soon discarded and sent off to be married to a middle manager in the Bin Laden construction firm.

    Osama revered the father he rarely got to see and adored his mother. As a teenager, he “would lie at her feet and caress her,” a family friend told Steve Coll, for his definitive biography “The Bin Ladens: An Arabian Family in the American Century.”

    Like many people who go on to alter history, for good and evil, Bin Laden lost his father when he was about 9. The family patriarch was killed in a plane crash caused by an American pilot in the Saudi province of Asir. (Five of the Sept. 11 hijackers would come from that province. His brother was later killed in a plane crash on American soil.)

    Osama was an extremely shy child, Coll writes. He was an outsider in his new family but also the golden goose. His allowance and inheritance was the source of his family’s wealth.

    He lived a suburban existence and was sent to an elite school, wearing a blue blazer and being taught by European teachers. As a boy he watched “Bonanza” and became infatuated by another American show called “Fury,” about a troubled orphaned boy who goes off to a ranch and tames wild horses. He was a mediocre student but religiously devout. He made it to university, but didn’t last long. He married his first cousin when she was 14 and went into the family business.

    I repeat these personal facts because we have a tendency to see history as driven by deep historical forces. And sometimes it is. But sometimes it is driven by completely inexplicable individuals, who combine qualities you would think could never go together, who lead in ways that violate every rule of leadership, who are able to perpetrate enormous evils even though they themselves seem completely pathetic.

    Analysts spend their lives trying to anticipate future threats and understand underlying forces. But nobody could have possibly anticipated Bin Laden’s life and the giant effect it would have. The whole episode makes you despair about making predictions.

    As a family man, Bin Laden was interested in sex, cars and work but was otherwise devout. He did not permit photography in his presence. He banned “Sesame Street,” Tabasco sauce and straws from his home. He covered his eyes if an unveiled woman entered the room. He liked to watch the news, but he had his children stand by the set and turn down the volume whenever music came on.

    As Coll emphasized in an interview on Monday, this sort of devoutness, while not everybody’s cup of tea, was utterly orthodox in his society. He was not a rebel as a young man.

    After the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, he organized jihadi tourism: helping young, idealistic Arab fighters who wanted to spend some time fighting the invaders. He was not a fighter himself, more of a courier and organizer, though after he survived one Soviet bombardment, he began to fashion a self-glorifying mythology.

    He was still painfully shy but returned with an enormous sense of entitlement. In 1990, he wanted to run the Saudi response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. He also thought he should run the family business. After he was shot down for both roles, the radicalism grew.

    We think of terrorism leaders as hard and intimidating. Bin Laden was gentle and soft, with a flaccid handshake. Yet his soldiers have told researchers such as Peter Bergen, the author of “The Longest War,” that meeting him was a deeply spiritual experience. They would tell stories of his ability to avoid giving offense and forgive transgressors.

    We think of terrorists as trying to build cells and organizations, but Bin Laden created an anti-organization — an open-source set of networks with some top-down control but much decentralization and a willingness to embrace all recruits, regardless of race, sect or nationality.

    We think of war fighters as using violence to seize property and power, but Bin Laden seemed to regard murder as a subdivision of brand management. It was a way to inspire the fund-raising networks, dominate the news and manipulate meaning.

    In short, Osama Bin Laden seemed to live in an ethereal, postmodern world of symbols and signifiers and also a cruel murderous world of rage and humiliation. Even the most brilliant intelligence analyst could not anticipate such an odd premodern and postglobalized creature, or could imagine that such a creature would gain such power.

    I just wish there were a democratic Bin Laden, that amid all the Arab hunger for dignity and freedom there was another inexplicable person with the ability to frame narratives and propel action — for good, not evil.

    So far, there doesn’t seem to be, which is tragic because individuals matter.

  8. #28


    From the Washington Post - - -

    Arab Responce to Bin Laden's Death Muted

    BEIRUT — A decade ago, the Middle East might have responded to the killing of Osama bin Laden with fury at the United States. But with the region convulsed by mostly peaceful popular revolutions, the response to his death has been muted, another signal that the old Arab order is being swept away.

    For this new generation, the young Tunisian who set himself on fire and ignited a revolution is a bigger hero than bin Laden, whose vision of martyrdom and jihad has been replaced by more prosaic aspirations such as free elections, good governance and an end to corruption.

    “You will see protests for freedom and democracy, yes. But for Osama bin Laden? Definitely not,” said Mustafa Alani, director of the Security and Terrorism Studies Program at the Gulf Research Center in Dubai.

    In the Arab world, he said, al-Qaeda was “already dying.”

    The news of the death of the world’s most famous Arab prompted some loud anti-American voices. The Muslim Brotherhood called for the United States to withdraw from the region now that its chief foe was eliminated, and in the Gaza Strip, the Hamas movement condemned the killing, praising bin Laden as “an Arab and Muslim warrior.”

    The region remains home to powerful strains of Islamist extremism, able to inflict great damage, even if their followers are relatively few in number.

    But for many, bin Laden was as much a part of the old Arab order as the presidents of Egypt and Tunisia who were swept away by the populist clamor for change earlier this year, along with the other leaders in Syria, Yemen, Libya and elsewhere who are battling for their political lives against a groundswell of unrest.

    “The timing of Osama bin Laden’s death has just been perfect,” said Abdulkhaleq Abdulla, a professor of political science at Emirates University. “Osama was one of the leaders — an inspiration to some — that were behind the misery, defeats and stagnation that the Arab world has been going through.”

    Now, he said, “his death adds to the modern, moderate and democratic Arab world that is currently in the making. This new Middle East is in sharp contrast to those who defined it before this year of change. Osama was an important force, but this is his end.”

    In some places, his death was met with the shrugs of a people who have long since moved on.

    “He died?” said Mohammed Shaaban, 21, as he took his lunch break at Cairo University, where few seemed to have heard the news many hours after President Obama announced that bin Laden had been killed.

    “Egypt is removed from all this,” said Kholoud Samir, 20, a law student, who had heard the news but seemed unconcerned. Nevertheless, she added, “Now that he’s gone, I hope the U.S. has nothing to do with the Arab world.”

    In Syria, the latest Arab country to be caught up in the turmoil, a student protester in the northern coastal town of Baniyas said people there were celebrating bin Laden’s death. “We are very happy that he was killed because he is a terrorist and we don’t like violence,” said the student, whose name is being withheld for his safety.

    Al-Qaeda’s fading allure was a trend discernible long before the protests began sweeping through the region at the beginning of the year. It was perhaps most noticeable in Iraq, where Sunnis turned against the al-Qaeda in Iraq insurgents holding sway in their neighborhoods in 2006 and formed the Awakening movement, joining U.S. troops to almost, but not quite, defeat the extremists.

    In Baghdad, government spokesman Ali Musawi welcomed the news. “The Iraqi people are among the most happy people, because we are the ones who suffered most from al-Qaeda,” he said.

    Opinion polls have detected a steady decline in positive perceptions of al-Qaeda across the Arab world since the middle of the last decade, when the grisly, wall-to-wall satellite television coverage of beheadings and suicide bombings broadcast across the region from Iraq began to give Arabs pause for thought.

    In 2004, 67 percent of Jordanians regarded al-Qaeda as “a legitimate resistance movement,” said Fares Braizat, who is in charge of polling at the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies in the Qatari capital, Doha. After al-Qaeda carried out suicide bombings against Jordanian hotels in 2005, that number fell to 20 percent, he said.

    In the Palestinian territories, confidence in al-Qaeda fell from 72 percent in 2003 to 34 percent in 2011, according to polling conducted by the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project. In Lebanon it fell from 19 percent to 1 percent.

    The youth-led revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia crystallized the irrelevance of al-Qaeda and its extremist aspirations “because they achieved so much more than al-Qaeda ever achieved,” said Kamal Habib, a former member of the extremist Islamic Jihad movement in Egypt who now researches Islamist politics.

    “Al-Qaeda’s peak was in 2003 with the invasion of Iraq,” he said. “There was an absolute panic that the West would somehow invade the Arab world. All this created a lot of fear and made al-Qaeda’s rhetoric more acceptable.”

    “But now groups like al-Qaeda are facing a real crisis. People are saying, ‘If I can achieve change peacefully, why should I follow al-Qaeda?’ ’’

    Yet al-Qaeda still is active in some of the most troubled areas of the region, including Yemen, North Africa and Iraq, and it cannot be counted out altogether, Braizat said.

    “Al-Qaeda is going to lose rather than gain only if the revolutions succeed in producing proper democratic governments,” he warned. “It still has franchises out there, and wherever there are injustices, it will have appeal.”


  9. #29


    Agree with Madam 5FC. The war against terrorism is far from over.

    People here in the gulf are skeptical about this development. Whilst some people think that Bin Laden's death would just paved a way for another extremist's rise, there are still a number of people in denial about his death and thinking that this is just another US (CIA) storyline.

    Nevertheless, I still welcome this development and would take it anytime of the day.

  10. #30


    I agree that the war against terror is far from over but the killing of UBL by the FLO is a major victory, needless to say. It's not a knockout punch but it's the kind of punch that will scare the enemy and leave him with no choice but to run. The bullet that ended UBL's life also shattered a myth, a symbol, a rallying point.

    The long term failure of the FLO to track and capture/kill UBL gave the Islamic jihadists courage to wage war, simply because UBL served as a symbol of the Islamic warrior who deftly evaded the high tech surveillance system of the allied forces. It gave them the false hope that they can bring the allied forces down to their knees.

    Question is - who will be the next UBL? There are many lunatics and/or fundamentalists out there jockeying for the vacant position.

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