View Full Version : Basketball Rules

05-31-2011, 07:41 PM
i noticed during the Filoil games, the clock is no longer reset to 24 when a foul is called, is this a new FIBA rule or is it a rule adopted by this particular tournament only? Doesn't it give an advantage to the fouling team especially if there are only a few seconds left on the shot clock?

07-14-2011, 06:23 PM


Art. 2.2.3 Free-throw lines and restricted areas

The restricted areas shall be the floor rectangle areas marked on the playing court.

The restricted (three-second) area shall be a rectangle (not anymore a trapezoid) as per Diagram 1 below. .....

Art. 2.2.4 Three-point field goal area

The distance of the three-point line shall be 6,75 m (and not 6,25 m as present).

Art. 2.2.7 No-charge semicircles

The no-charge semicircles shall be marked on the playing court, under the baskets. The distance of the inner edge of the semicircles shall be 1,25 m from the centre of the basket (on the floor).

A charging (offensive) foul should never be called if the contact by the offensive player is with the defensive player standing within the no-charge semicircle.
Apparently FIBA is becoming like the NBA (except for the game duration) with the key becoming rectangular and the three-point line becoming farther like a PBA three-point line (but still far from the NBA three-point line). Does this rules applies now to UAAP?

03-27-2014, 10:57 AM
Would Michael Jordan have starred in today's NBA?

By Mike Prada @MikePradaSBN on Mar 25 2014, 9:47a 56

Many say the rules changes to open up the game would make the game's greatest player even more effective, but is that really true? On the flip side: would today's best player, LeBron James, fare well in Jordan's era?

Basketball as we currently know it didn't exist in the 1990s. Yes, the object of the game was still to put the ball in the hoop. Yes, the team that had the most points after 48 minutes was declared the winner. Yes, teams still had five guys a side.

But it wasn't the same game. Today's game is fast, guard-driven, perimeter-oriented, spacing-infested, chaotic. Outside shooting is the most important offensive skill; lateral quickness and length tie for the most essential defensive one. The 1990s' game, on the other hand, was everything today's game is not. It was slow, post-oriented, physical, structured. If you were big and/or tall, you had a huge advantage.

This is why many find Michael Jordan's dominance in that era even more remarkable. Jordan succeeded during a period where the deck was stacked against guards. He soared over his taller enemies, taking special glee in dethroning Patrick Ewing. This has led that same school of thought to suggest that Jordan would have it easier today, that he'd take advantage of the extra space not being cramped by behemoths and physical hand-checking defenders.

But that'd be too simple. Would Jordan really dominate in today's game? In contrast, would LeBron James really struggle in Jordan's era?

Ever notice the way point guards used to back their way down the court, using their wide posteriors as a way to shield off defenders? Ever notice how only 38-year-old Andre Miller ever does that anymore? It's because of hand-checking, which allowed defenders to stick their forearms into their man's chest to impede their progress towards the rim. With that kind of advantage, the best way to prevent defenders from poking at the ball was to make them hand-check the back.

Oh, sure, it technically wasn't allowed. The league tried outlawing the practice several times to no avail. In 1978 -- yes, 1978 -- the league said if hand-checking impeded a player's forward progress, it was to be prohibited using "rigid enforcement." That didn't work. After a particularly ugly Finals in 1994, the league tried again, outlawing all hand-checking that happened from the baseline to the opposing three-point line. That somewhat alleviated the problem, but the game was still as physical as ever in the frontcourt. It was only in 2004, when the league disallowed any arm contact on drives and added a new defensive three-second rule, that hand-checking was truly eradicated.

This is what Jordan faced every night. Nobody was quick enough to stay with him, so they clutched, grabbed and held to prevent him from getting to the basket. The Pistons started the practice, the Knicks continued it and countless other contenders copied it.

The hand-check gave a second life to so many slow perimeter players. Craig Ehlo would have been fried in this era unless he developed some lateral quickness, for example. But he ultimately was the man tasked with checking Jordan, and despite some memorable failures, he was better at it than most.

This is a world LeBron James never knew. At his size, James would have been physically imposing in any area, but he's especially difficult to contend with when he's able to get a full head of steam against a player who cannot hand-check. Hand-checking was a proactive defensive measure; without that tactic, defenders must react to James by sliding their feet to beat him to the spot. Tough to do when he can drive through any bit of contact that results from being late.

But keep in mind: this only applies to the man directly in front of Jordan or LeBron. While the changes here aid Jordan's case, the changes elsewhere do the opposite.


Five-man defensive schemes in the 90s were incredibly simple compared to today. The passage of time explains some of this: every industry is built on innovation, and innovation is built on fixing a problem with the common methods of the present. There would be no Tom Thibodeau without Chuck Daly; no Mike D'Antoni without the Showtime Lakers.

But the simplicity was also due to the existing rules, which penalized teams for, essentially, playing zone. If you wanted to double-team a player, you had to double-team a player. There was no digging down, no helping off non-shooters to pre-rotate to stop the bigger scoring threat. It was double-team or nothing. And while a few teams, such as George Karl's Sonics, would break the rules and dare officials to whistle for illegal defense, most abided by the regulations.

This made it especially easy to post up. Send your tallest man on the block, let him back down his single defender, and all he needs to do is pick out the teammate who the defense helped off to double-team. If no double-team, go to work. Consider the massive difference in these two screenshots:

The first is from a 1993 playoff game between the Nets and Cavaliers. New Jersey is so concerned with Brad Daugherty's ability to see over the defense and find the open man that they are single-covering him. Rumeal Robinson and Drazen Petrovic are sticking on their men, Chris Morris is sort of coming to help and Derrick Coleman has one foot outside the paint because he needs to stay within that length of Larry Nance. Daugherty hits a short turnaround on the play.

The second is from a March Rockets-Magic game. Dwight Howard has the ball in a similar spot, yet must deal with Arron Afflalo digging down from the top of the key, Jameer Nelson lingering in the lane instead of staying with Patrick Beverley and a third defender (he's hidden) in the paint thanks to Terrence Jones. Howard does well to get a layup opportunity, but misses it amid all the arms in the paint.

The difference is stark. Where Daugherty has clear sailing, Howard has to consider multiple defenders who could impede his path. You can see why teams posted up so much back in the day. Centers who weren't double-teamed scored over each other, and centers who were double-teamed could easily find the open man.

That had lasting implications. These days, coaches bench size in favor of speed and shooting. They accept defensive trade-offs because too many non-shooters makes it impossible to conduct a reasonable offense. In the 90s, though, teams had to actually defend every player on the court unless they sent a hard double-team. This allowed teams to play unskilled titans or defensive specialists who nevertheless had to be accounted for because the rules said so.

This occasionally was taken to the extreme. In the 1991 playoffs, Don Nelson would station his biggest player, whether it was journeyman Jim Petersen, youngster Tyrone Hill or the previously unknown Tom Tolbert, 30 feet from the hoop just to get David Robinson out of the lane. They weren't going to do anything productive from 15 feet, much less 30, but Robinson still had to come out and pretend like they could anyway. The Warriors posted up Mitch Richmond and Chris Mullin against smaller players, feasted on the driving lanes Tim Hardaway now had and upset the Spurs in four games.

In 2014, Robinson would have tiptoed the lane while essentially playing a one-man zone around the rim and Nelson would have been forced to choose between going small and getting lit up on the other end or leaving his big men in and suffering spacing consequences. In 1991, those centers were the unsung heroes by standing aimlessly well beyond the three-point line and doing nothing.

Place LeBron James in this world, and you can see how he'd be even more devastating. He'd have to fight harder to beat his own man, but once that happened, it wouldn't be hard to pick out open players. He averages nearly seven assists for his career; imagine how many he'd have if he could back someone down, draw a double-team and easily find the open man. Imagine how many points he'd get in the low post if he only had one man to beat each time. Jordan prolonged his career by learning how to back his man down and shoot over them when he realized no help was coming. The development of LeBron's post game would have come much faster if he didn't have to worry as much about reading that help.

Again: compare this Jordan post-up alignment:

To this James one:

Jordan has an entire side without any bodies immediately in his way. James, meanwhile, has all five Rockets' eyes on him as he begins his move. Which do you think is easier to score against?


So, which player would be better in the other's era? It's complicated. In real life, James would learn how to use his size and raw strength more effectively and Jordan would have learned how to rifle crosscourt passes to open three-point shooters while running the high pick-and-roll.

In this fantasy world? It's tough to say. Perhaps Jordan would have put up bigger numbers in the regular season against poor defenses, only to struggle against the quickness and length of tough, smart schemes in the playoffs. How would he fare against a team like the Pacers that would corral him in a mid-range pocket on a pick-and-roll? By contrast, perhaps LeBron would have averaged 13 assists a game, yet be stifled in the post by wider, slower defenders on teams that refused to double-team him. LeBron would not have enjoyed going up against Anthony Mason, that's for sure.

In other words, they were both great for their own specific eras. It's a boring answer, but it's also the right one.

For screen caps and diagrams of this article: http://www.sbnation.com/2014/3/25/5542838/nba-rules-changes-lebron-james-michael-jordan

Sam Miguel
03-25-2015, 08:15 AM



6:30 AM


Editor’s note: With the start of the NCAA basketball tournament, WIRED is reprising this feature about how Kirk Goldsberry’s obsession with basketball with statistics is changing pro hoops.

As a kid, Kirk Goldsberry was a rabid basketball fan. But this was the 1980s, and living near Penn State meant his house wasn't quite close enough to Philadelphia to get 76ers games on TV. And so, casting about for a team, he latched on to Dominique Wilkins and the Atlanta Hawks. They were 750 miles away, but through the magic of superstation TBS, Goldsberry could follow them as if he himself hailed from Georgia.

Goldsberry went on to get his bachelor's degree in earth science and geography at Penn State, and then a master's and PhD in geography from UC Santa Barbara, where he wrote his dissertation on real-time traffic maps of the Internet. He was interested in finding ways to visually depict data about movement through space and time—to make numbers visible. Maps and space defined how Goldsberry processed the world. Well, maps, space, and basketball.

All through his education, Goldsberry didn't just watch basketball; he played it too—recreationally, in pickup games. And as he played, he started to think about the game and how it differed from other sports. Analytics—breaking down play and performance with statistics—was starting to supplement more traditional coaching and evaluation methods like watching videotape and working on physical fundamentals.

That revolution had begun in baseball—as Michael Lewis documented in his book Moneyball. But baseball is, relatively speaking, a pretty simple game from a statistical perspective. It centers on a clean sequence of one-on-one confrontations between a batter and a pitcher, and each play has a defined start and end point. (A statistician would call each of those plays a “state.”) Given that, and the wealth of play-by-play data available to researchers, you can do the math on any given situation in a game to predict the odds of the next event. If a team has a runner on first base with one out, there's a 28 percent chance that team will score in that inning. And so on.

But Goldsberry realized that moneyball didn't work on a basketball court. Unlike the static, state-to-state action in baseball, basketball is a constant flow. Players switch from offense to defense, from posting up to double-teaming. If a baseball player is a left fielder, you know the basic area he will patrol on defense. If a basketball player is a forward, he could be anywhere on the court at any time. The game has no states, so statistically you can't determine the odds of a given outcome. Analysts thought that calculating the value of individual events the way they could in baseball was basically impossible.

In other words, basketball was like one of Goldsberry's maps—a complicated, intertwining flow of information without a beginning or end. But that didn't mean it couldn't be analyzed. On the contrary, Goldsberry realized, he just needed the right kind of data. “From my own experiences as a player, I know that I have strengths and weaknesses that vary depending on where I am on the court, and I guessed that other players did as well,” he says. Instead of focusing on the numbers that defined a state in baseball, Goldsberry began to focus on the locations and movement of objects—specifically, the players and the ball. It was a mapping problem. From that perspective, and with the help of some massive new data sets, he could do more than merely quantify what people thought they knew about the game. He could discover hidden truths about hoops, shining light into dark corners that no one even knew were corners. To understand baseball, you might need a statistician who can understand percentage and probability. But to understand basketball, you also have to understand space. You need a cartographer. Specifically, you need Kirk Goldsberry.

IN 2011, WHEN he had some spare time off from his teaching gigs at Michigan State and Harvard, Goldsberry began building his mapping system. But getting the relevant data turned out to be an obstacle. Tracking 10 players in constant motion isn't trivial. He started scouring fan sites and sports coverage, and eventually he found stats for every shot taken in the NBA. It wasn't much—just who took the shot, from where, and whether it went in. But it was a start.

The data wasn't exactly private, but neither was it public—Goldsberry scraped it from the web. Specifically, he found that ESPN.com published shot charts with the box score of each game. He found the files that powered them and grabbed their information. “They were publishing these data sets but not using them to the potential that I saw in them,” Goldsberry says.

Eventually he pulled together a database with the spatial coordinates for every shot taken from 2006 to 2011—more than 700,000 of them. Then Goldsberry the cartographer teamed up with Goldsberry the hoops junkie. “I wanted to find a way to get this data to sing a new song, to tell us things like where Kobe is good and where Kobe is bad,” he says. And he wanted to do more than just crunch numbers. Goldsberry wanted to show people, “to communicate to players, and fans, and the media.”

He divided the 1,284 square feet of the court where players actually shoot—basically from just outside the three-point line and closer—into cells, like in a computer strategy game. Then he used his scraped data to generate maps that showed where a given player shot from, how often, and how effective those shots were.

Goldsberry called his system CourtVision, and it showed differences in players no one had ever quantified. Ray Allen, one of the NBA's best shooters, had several deadly hot zones from three-point range, and he barely attempted any midrange jumpers. Kobe Bryant, the Los Angeles Lakers' dynamic star, took lots of shots from all over the court, but there were places that, if you were playing against him, you'd prefer he shoot from (like the baseline, because he struggled to convert from there). Goldsberry had generated nothing less than an instant visual signature of a player's offensive game, easy to read and understand. This went way beyond what a smart analyst or coach might intuit from courtside. The more you studied the CourtVision maps, the more insights they revealed.

Goldsberry presented his work at the 2012 Sloan Sports Analytics Conference, an annual gathering of statisticians and coaches at MIT, and the basketball world basically freaked out. For the first time, fans could see the types of shots that their favorite players took, and the relative value of those shots. CourtVision didn't take into account variables like who the defender was or what else was happening on the court, but it still promised to give team management a powerful tool to evaluate players, to make sure that they were efficient and that their style fit in with a team's philosophy. After the talk Mark Cuban, owner of the Dallas Mavericks, and R. C. Buford, general manager of the San Antonio Spurs, both came up to Goldsberry wanting to hear more. As he put it: “It was sort of a moment of ‘Oh my God, if I do this right, I might be able to go turn this into something that's bigger than just a thing I do on nights and weekends.’”

Sam Miguel
03-25-2015, 08:16 AM
^^^ (Cont'd)

ONE OF THE people intrigued by Goldsberry's work was Brian Kopp, then an executive at Stats, located just outside of Chicago. A group of baseball researchers started Stats in the 1980s to gather the best statistical information they could about the game. Now the company is a behemoth, providing statistical information about professional sports in the US to teams, leagues, and the media. In 2012, Stats was working on basketball too—messing around with a new kind of data-gathering it called SportVU. Shortly after that 2012 presentation at the Sloan conference, Kopp called Goldsberry and asked if he would be interested in taking a look.

SportVU builds on computer-controlled optical technology developed by Israeli scientists to track missiles. In 2005 the Israelis adapted it to sports, mounting three cameras above a soccer pitch to watch the game and feed data to a central computer. Thanks to parallax and other computer-vision trickery, the system could track every object on the field, from the players to the ball to the officials, and plot them in three dimensions, 25 times a second. In 2008 Stats bought SportVU with an eye toward developing a six-camera setup for basketball.

The gear wasn't cheap—any NBA team that wanted this information had to pay roughly $100,000 for the installation of the cameras and computers in its arena. By the end of the 2012–2013 season, only 15 teams had done so, and the data had huge gaps—only about half the games were captured. But the data that was there looked like it had a lot of potential. In September 2013, the NBA signed an agreement to install the system in every arena in the league.

“Brian called me and was basically like, ‘Do you want to play with this data?’” Goldsberry says. “I had the good fortune to get access when very few people outside of the NBA had seen it.” It was a jackpot, a gold mine, far more granular than the data he scraped from ESPN.com, providing a complete narrative of every possession, where and how players moved to produce the final shot. Once he had that, he could answer all sorts of questions. Want to know how far a player ran during a game? No sweat. Wondering who the most efficient passer is on your team? Easy. How does your pick-and-roll efficiency compare with the league average when you start the move with less than 15 seconds left on the shot clock? SportVU could answer that too.

But one thing that really got Goldsberry frothing was the ability to understand one of the most vexing aspects of the sport: defense. For decades, teams had relied on simple counting stats—how many steals, how many blocks—to capture a player's defensive value. SportVU gave a much more sophisticated picture. Now Goldsberry could find, objectively, the best way to play defense against a pick-and-roll, or which players were especially good at getting into passing lanes to disrupt the offense.

A year after his first Sloan conference presentation, Goldsberry went back to MIT armed with the SportVU data and a new perspective on defense. This time the room was packed—with not just his fellow researchers but also executives from around the NBA.

Goldsberry started by observing that the area right around the basket is the most important real estate on the court to defend. It's the region where offensive players sink the most shots. So Goldsberry looked at how defenders within 5 feet of the basket were able to prevent opponents from scoring. The average NBA defender allowed a shooting percentage of 49.7 in those close quarters.

He identified two classes of defense. In the first type, defenders blocked or altered their opponents' shots—that is, they reduced “shooting efficiency.” By this metric, Indiana Pacers center Roy Hibbert and Milwaukee Bucks center Larry Sanders were stars, holding opponents to just 38 percent. On the flip side, Luis Scola, then of the Houston Rockets and later the Phoenix Suns, and David Lee, of the Golden State Warriors, were defensive disasters, allowing shooters to make 62 and 61 percent of their shots, respectively. That was interesting but perhaps not particularly shocking. It was, in a sense, the flip side of the data on offense he'd presented the year before.

The second approach to defense was more subtle, and more of a surprise. Some players, it turned out, reduced the frequency of their opponents' shots, not just the efficiency. This was something only Goldsberry's data could show: By comparing the average rate of shots to the rate when specific defenders were guarding the area, Goldsberry could calculate when the number of shots tailed off. The lead shot-dampener was Dwight Howard, who caused teams to shoot 9 percent less often around the basket. Goldsberry called this the Dwight Effect—it was the name of his talk, actually. When Howard was protecting the hoop, Goldsberry said, his opponents took fewer close-range shots and settled for many more from the midrange—the least productive shots in the NBA.

One NBA executive in the crowd at Goldsberry's talk was Daryl Morey. Morey is the general manager of the Houston Rockets, where he's turned the organization into one of the most forward-thinking in the league, investing a great deal of time and energy in analytics and sports science. He's also an alum of the Sloan School and cofounded the event; he's still a cochair. Maybe it's a coincidence. Maybe it's not. But it's worth noting that four months after watching Kirk Goldsberry's demonstration, Morey signed Dwight Howard to a massive contract.

Every conversation about the use of statistical analysis in sports returns, as if drawn by its inescapable gravity, to Moneyball. Part of that is because it's such a terrific book, and its hero, general manager Billy Beane of the Oakland A's, is such a great character. And partly it's that Michael Lewis' storytelling prowess made it easier to understand the stats. Moneyball was the story that explained the concept of sports analytics to a mainstream audience.

And yet the statistics that underlie the moneyball effect were not new to Beane. From early researchers like F. C. Lane in the 1910s to Allan Roth in the 1940s to Earnshaw Cook and his landmark book, Percentage Baseball, in 1964, the game had long had a small but strong tradition of analysis. And starting in the mid-1970s, a former security guard at a pork and beans factory codified knowledge of the game in his self-published Bill James Baseball Abstract.

Beane's talent, then, wasn't statistical but operational. He was able to build, for the first time, an organization that capitalized on long-standing and well-known statistical information. That's to say, the competitive advantage didn't come from a novel theory of the game; it came from being able to act on it.

Now, as new technologies start to generate terabytes of data about players and tactics, that next great competitive advantage will go to the number crunchers and analysts who can make sense of all those signals. Take the statistical tsunami of SportVU in the NBA. “It's not an exaggeration to say that 85 percent of the teams don't know what to do with this data,” Goldsberry says. “The idea that this is going to revolutionize the NBA—well, I'm not sure that's true unless teams awaken really quickly to things like machine learning and data visualization.”

The 15 percent of team executives who do know what to do with the data? Those are the next Billy Beanes. At this year's Sloan conference, Goldsberry gave a three-peat championship presentation. Because what Goldsberry was actually doing was slicing basketball games into moments, instants, and then applying the same kind of analysis previous generations of sports analysts had applied to the states in baseball. Goldsberry and his team could then quantify the value—in terms of points—of every move on the court, from an entry pass into the post to a dribble drive.

This sort of analysis opens up a new way of evaluating everything a player does. “You'll be able to see which players are moving the needle up and which ones are moving it down,” Goldsberry says. “It's like the new microeconomics of basketball.”

This is no longer a part-time hobby for Goldsberry. He has parlayed his work into a job writing about analytics for the sports website Grantland, and although he won't confirm it, there are reports that multiple NBA teams have consulted with him. And he's still at Harvard, where he's organized a group of students that call themselves the XY Hoops after the mathematic shorthand for the coordinate system. “This wasn't my idea—it came from my students,” Goldsberry says. “It's like I'm the Foo Fighters, and they're the hot new band. I'm almost a nostalgia act already.”

The key paper that Goldsberry and his team wrote is called “A Multiresolution Stochastic Process Model for Predicting Basketball Possession Outcomes.” But for public consumption, he came up with a better title: DataBall.

From Faster, Higher, Stronger: How Sports Science Is Creating a New Generation of Superathletes—and What We Can Learn from Them by Mark McClusky. Reprinted by arrangement with Hudson Street Press, a member of Penguin Group (USA) LLC, a Penguin Random House Company. Copyright © Mark McClusky, 2014.

11-03-2015, 10:02 AM
Were referees right to call double lane violation? Guevarra, Cristobal give take

From: Reuben TerradoNovember 2, 2015, 06:55 pm

THE controversial end to Game Three of the NCAA Finals betwen Letran and San Beda has sparked a debate on the Fiba rule on double lane violations, with not a few calling for changes in the way college leagues apply it.

At the center of the controversy is a double lane violation called by the referees on Letran's McJour Luib and San Beda's Art Dela Cruz after Knights center Jomari Sollano missed the second of his free throws with 6 seconds left and the Knights leading by a point, 83-82.

Under Fiba rules which the NCAA adheres to, ball possession after such violations is decided not through a jump ball but through 'alternating possession' or, in layman's terms, possession arrows.

That single rule worked to Letran's advantage since the possession arrow was in their favor. Knights senior guard Mark Cruz ended up making the two free throws that sealed Letran's 85-82 overtime victory - and the school's first NCAA championship in a decade.

The furor, however, did not end there.

Just moments after the loss, San Beda team manager Jude Roque, apparently fuming over that crucial call, tweeted that the 'refs made sure the NCAA sees a new champion,' claiming bias in the way the referees called the game.

In a column he wrote for the Manila Times on Monday, Roque remained firm in his stand that the referees wrongly interpreted the rule on such infractions, saying ball possession should've been awarded to the Red Lions since Luib prematurely entered the shaded lane well ahead of Dela Cruz.

However, veteran officials whose views Spin.ph gathered, among them NCAA commissioner Bai Cristobal and NCAA technical supervisor Romy Guevarra, said the referees were right to call a jump ball in the play - and later award the ball to the Knights based on the possession arrow.

They simply pointed to a line in Section 43.3.3 of the 2014 Fiba rules which states that in cases where players from both teams committed a lane violation "on the last or only free throw, a jump ball situation occurs."

"It was the correct call," said Guevarra, a former international referee who served as the technical supervisor of the PBA for 14 years. He added that a review of the game tape showed that it was not only Dela Cruz but also another San Beda player who committed an infraction by going inside the three-point arc before Sollano could shoot his free throw.

University of the Philippines assistant coach Allan Gregorio, who called Game Three for ABS-CBN Sports, also believed that the referees, particularly Nestor Sambrano, made the correct decision.

“There is a single lane violation and a double lane violation. Obviously, that was a double lane violation. Puwede bang i-let go ni Nestor Sambrano? I’m not the lawyer of Nestor Sambrano pero I give it to him for calling that because it was really quite obvious na hindi pa tumitira, nagkakagulo na sa lane,” he said.

“Regardless if (there is) one second (left or) if it’s the start of the ballgame, that violation is a violation and it had to be called,” said Gregorio.

Cristobal, on the other hand, said all 10 league teams have been briefed about the rule on double lane violations prior to the season, and were even warmed that such violation should be avoided.

“Umikot ako sa 10 eskwela tapos nagkaroon kami ng orientation sa Mapua, lahat ng coaches nandoon. Inexplain namin ‘yun, what is a double lane violation, (na) huwag kayo sumama (when a rival player enters the shaded lane prematurely before a free throw),” Cristobal said.

Guevarra also shot down the Roque claim that ball possession should have been awarded to San Beda since Luib entered the lane ahead of Dela Cruz.

There was another opinion put forward that the referees should have stopped Sollano from taking the free throw and reset the play the moment Luib entered the lane prematurely, a position likewise debunked by Guevarra who said that it was not an option under Fiba rules.

However, the controversy took on a new dimension when Letran players admitted they were very much aware of the consequences of the double lane violation rule and had actually baited San Beda players - in this case Dela Cruz - into committing the infraction, knowing the possession arrow was in their favor.

Their reasoning was, Sollano's free throw would still be counted even if Luib is called for a lane violation. And granting that he missed, the ball would simply be awarded to the Red Lions who were expected to win the rebound anyway.

That admission has led to an accusation from Roque that the tactic was not 'within the spirit of the rules' as he called for a review of the rules on such infractions.

Other coaches agreed, saying the double lane violation rule plus the possession arrow system leave an opening which teams can exploit to their advantage in tight games, as Letran did in Game Three.

Gregorio said he favors a shift to a house rule that used to be applied in the UAAP, where all double lane violations committed inside a game's final two minutes were followed by a jump ball.

“That is fair para hindi magamit ng mga teams ‘yung possession arrow (to their advantage)," he said. "Hindi puwedeng gawing advantage ‘yung ganun. How can one violation go to the advantage of one team through the possession arrow when two teams committed a violation?”

Guevarra said he is also in favor of such a rule being put in place in the NCAA in the future. However, the veteran official pointed out that the house rule was dropped by the UAAP itself this season when the league decided to adhere to Fiba rules point for point.

"Gusto nila strictly Fiba rules na lahat ang maga-apply sa liga," Guevarra said.

For his part, Cristobal said he doesn’t believe that the double lane violation is advantageous to any team, since all the player needs to do is not enter the lane when a rival player makes such a violation.

“Walang advantage diyan. Huwag ka lang sumama,” Cristobal insisted.

Guevarra, 79, said that if there is one lesson that can be learned from the controversy, it is that players should be very much aware of the rules and their consequences during games.

"Dapat aware sila palagi," he said.